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ANSWERS TO SYKES' CLAIMS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Hatch takes issue with portions of Sykes' "Statement of the Case." 
The 4 claims made by Sykes at the bottom of page 6 are all false and 
none of them prevailed in court under the scrutiny of testimony and 
evidence. 
Contrary to Sykes' statements, the three Sykes were allowed to 
fully participate in the trial, including opening and closing statements, 
testifying, cross examination, and calling their own witnesses for direct and 
redirect examination. 
DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DEFAULTING MR. SYKES IN THIS CASE? 
In the default ruling, and for well over a decade, the court has 
exercised great patience with Mr. Sykes and has endured abuse after abuse. 
Mr. Sykes has repeatedly disregarded court rules and instructions. The 
patience of the court was clearly manifest before and during the latest trial. 
On January 5, 1994, in a "Final Pre-trial Conference," the court 
issued a default judgment against the Sykes' for failure to answer an 
l 
Amended Complaint and for failure to appear at the said conference. 
(R 1188). The court ordered the trial to proceed on January 27, 1994 to 
determine damages suffered by Mr. Hatch from the tortuous conduct of the 
Sykes'. 
The court later gave in to pleadings for mercy by Dwane Sykes and 
set aside the default and agreed to scheduled a new date for another pre-
trial hearing and for a new trial. (R 1242). This impertinent and abusive 
delay by Sykes resulted in additional and great expense to Hatch. 
In the new pre-trial hearing and Scheduling Conference held on 
September 2, 1994 (R. 1444), time constraints needed to accommodate a 
jury trial in 6 days were considered. The number of witnesses and the time 
needed to present the issues were carefully considered. Out of those 
deliberations and with mutual agreement came the following Order issued 
by the Court: 
Approximately 22 people will be expected to appear 
as witnesses. Each side will be limited to no more than 6 
"character" witnesses, going to the issue of credibility. Each 
side will be allowed approximately 17 hours to present his 
case. (R. 1443) (Emphasis added). 
In violation of this court order, Mr. Sykes submitted a witness list of 
74 (68 by name and 6 by title) ( R 1682). Included in the list of 68 were 30 
already designated as character witnesses by Mr. Sykes, himself, in his 
Exhibit 84, pages 1, 2, & 3. This exhibit (witness list) was referred to by 
Sykes at the bottom of the witness list he filed with the court on October 19, 
1994 (R 1383). He referred to the list as "all persons on Sykes' 3-page list 
filed in the 1980s of Howard Hatch's dissatisfied business associates." 
These names were not evidence witnesses but were set up and groomed 
by Dwane Sykes to be character assassins of Mr. Hatch in Dwane's efforts 
to confuse the issues and befuddle the jury (R 1383 and Exhibit 84). The 
character of Mr. Hatch was not an issue in this case, but Mr. Sykes was 
desperate and grasping at anything that might tend to mitigate damage 
resulting from his own tortuous conduct. 
But the witness list, which greatly exceeded the limit set by the court, 
was only a part of the many abuses inflicted on the Court and on Mr. Hatch 
by Dwane Sykes, resulting in the Default ruling by the court (R 2056-2059). 
During the 46 days preceding the trial (December 23, 1994 through 
February 6, 1995) Dwane Sykes inundated the Court and Mr. Hatch with 
over 50 documents consisting of over 350 pages, almost entirely 
irrelevant, redundant, and often spurious. (And that does not include the 
exhibits.) The flood of documents consisted of petitions, motions, requests, 
letters, certificates, orders to show cause, affidavits, objections, notice of 
interest, deeds, etc. The entire case has been similarly abused by Dwane 
Sykes over the years, until now the court record fills 3 large cardboard 
boxes and weighs in excess of 80 pounds when the companion case CV-
63,695 is included. 
On January 12, 1995, Howard Hatch in his argument in response to 
one of Sykes'many motions stated: 
Mr. Sykes comes to this court begging for special 
consideration with very "dirty hands." He has done all in his 
power to subvert the judicial process, and now he expects this 
court to violate its own order to accommodate him in his very 
late and dilatory request. 
It is clear to me that it is a tactic to either put off the trial 
or to cause enough confusion as to make it impossible for me 
to put in the time necessary to properly prepare, i.e. identify 
documents, subpoena witnesses, prepare jury instructions, 
organize the presentation, etc. . . . (R. 1577) 
The court stated well its reasons for defaulting the Sykes' in its Order 
of Default (R. 2056-2059). In addition to the Sykes' complete disregard of 
the court's specific order governing the list of witnesses and especially the 
"character" witnesses, the court cites other abuses leading to the default 
order. Some of those abuses cited are the following (R 2056-2059): 
5. ". . . the Court was constantly bombarded by a myriad of disparate 
requests, objections and ex parte motions, some mailed, some faxed, but 
4 
none of them strictly meeting the form requirements set down by the rules, 
all during a time reserved for trial preparations." 
6. " None of the time deadlines layed out in the pretrial order were 
properly complied with by the Sykes, either as to the witness list or exhibits 
(the final witness list was amended after the January 9 deadline and a 
motion made on January 9th for an extension of time in which to 'complete 
his compilation of exhibits and witnesses and lists' for trial." 
7. "The Plaintiffs, Sykes, have previously been defaulted for nqt 
answering the original complaint in the consolidated case CV 63,695, which 
was set aside by the good graces of the Court." 
8. "They were again defaulted for failing to answer the Second 
Amended Complaint (under CV 63,695), filed August 3, 1993, and for not 
appearing at the pretrial scheduling conference held January 5, 1994, which 
caused the opposing party substantial amounts in attorneys fees due to the 
striking of the trial date and the need to contest the objections to the default 
being taken." 
9. "This court, in an extra effort to deal equitably with the parties, did 
allow for the default ordered January 5, 1994, to be set aside by its Orcler 
February 23, 1994, allowing the Sykes to prepare and present their defenses 
5 
at a trial to be rescheduled." 
10. "However, the Court concluded because of the Sykes's actions 
noted above, and their manifest intention of subverting the judicial system, 
that they did indeed deserve to be defaulted." 
11. "Consequently, this Court, by its Order Regarding Court 
Availability dated February 1, 1995, did enter a default against the three 
PlaintitT/counterdefendant parties, Dennis L. Sykes, Dwane J. Sykes and 
Patricia Sykes." 
The Court in its Order further held: 
3. "That the Plaintiffs/counterdefendants shall be allowed to appear 
at trial to defend against the extent of damages requested or to attempt to 
mitigate them by justifying the actions taken by them." 
4. "That the defaulting parties' defense being stricken are judged 
without merit and their multitude of findings, objections to orders, requests 
for extensions, defaults, and other attempts to delay the conclusion of this 
matter these 14 years have all been in bad faith." (R 2056-2059). 
(Emphasis added.) 
The court did indeed have good and sufficient grounds for issuing 
a default against the Sykes' in (his case. 
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WAS DEFAULT TOO SEVERE? 
The Sykes' brief complains of the severity of a default judgment 
when less severe sanctions could be imposed. They cite Utah Dept. ojf 
Transportation v. Osguthorpe in support of their concern. But the very 
case they cite held as follows: 
Osguthorpe contends that the district court abused its 
discretion in denying the motion to set aside his default and 
the resulting judgment of just compensation because a number 
of lesser sanctions or remedies could have been imposed by 
the court without resorting to the "ultimate" sanction. 
However, 
before we will interfere with the trial court's exercise of 
discretion, abuse of that discretion must be clearly 
shown . . . . That some basis may exist to set aside the 
default does not require the conclusion that the court 
abused its discretion in refusing to do so when facts 
and circumstances support the refusal. 
Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted); see also Darrington, 812 P.2d at 457 (trial 
courts vested with considerable discretion to grant or deny 
motions to set aside default judgments.) 
The above comes from Utah Department of Transportation v. D. 
A. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Supreme Court of Utah - 1995) 
The trial court in its Order Regarding Court Availability issued on 
February 1, 1995, which included its Order defaulting Sykes stated: 
7 
Several months ago sanctions were imposed on Mr. 
Sykes for his failure to follow case management orders. The 
sanctions imposed on that occasion was dismissal of his claims 
against Mr. Hatch. 
The only remaining sanction appears to be to enter his 
default and remove him from the balance of this case. 
Consequently, this ORDER ISTHE DEFAULT of Mr. 
Sykes. He will not be allowed to appear and defend this action. 
(R 1755-1757). 
WAS SYKES DENIED DUE PROCESS 
Had the above Order stood, denying the Sykes' any participation in 
the trial in their efforts to mitigate damages, they might be heard to argue 
lack of "due process" or that they were denied their "day in court." 
Whether their argument would prevail is another matter. But, here the 
Sykes' were not denied their day in court nor were they denied due process. 
Dwane Sykes, Dennis Sykes and Patricia Sykes were all three 
allowed to appear in the case in an effort to defend against and to mitigate 
damages. This was done at the request and encouragement of Hatch and 
with permission of the Court. They were allowed to testify, to cross-
examine witnesses and to call their own witnesses. The trial was conducted 
as though the default order had never been issued. Dwane Sykes gave his 
opening statement (R. 2727). Dwane Sykes gave his closing statement (R. 
8 
3310). Dwane cross-examined Hatch's witnesses and Dwane called hiib 
own witnesses for direct examination (R. 3214 & 3234) and for redirect 
examination (R. 3260). And all this, contrary to the claims by Sykes in his 
Brief of Appellee/Cross Appellant. (See Sykes Brief, pages 14 & 16). 
Since the Sykes' were defaulted months ago on the issues, their only 
defense was an attempt to mitigate damages. And this they were given 
every opportunity to do. So even if the default order could be ruled an 
abuse of discretion, there still would be no grounds for ordering a new trial 
because the necessary elements of a second trial were found in this trial. 
Mr. Sykes was given "due process." His participation in the trial 
went forward as though there had been no default. He had his "day in 
court." And even his day in court was abused with his egregious and 
intolerable conduct (R 3294). 
Howard Hatch requests the Utah Court of Appeals to affirm the trial 
court's Order of Default and to affirm the trial court's denial of a new trial. 
RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL ON DAMAGES 
The Sykes' brief claims that I latch had no right to a jury trial on the 
issue of damages once default was entered against Sykes, To support their 
position their brief cites Arnica Mutual Insurance Co, v Schettler, 768 
9 
P.2d950. (Utah App. 1989) ("Arnica'1) 
In claiming Hatch had no right to a jury trial on damages, Sykes 
misreads the Arnica case. A correct reading of the Arnica case when 
applied to this case would read: '"Sykes had no right to a jury trial once 
default wa^ entered against him." It does not preclude Hatch from the right 
to a jury trial when default is entered against Sykes, but leaves Hatch the 
option to continue with a jury trial to assess damages or to unilaterally 
withdraw his "original demand for a jury trial and request a fact-finding 
hearing on the issue of damages pursuant to Rule 55 (b) (2) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure." (page 955 of the Arnica case). 
In the Arnica case, Arnica chose to withdraw uits original demand for 
a jury trial, and requested a fact-finding hearing on the issue of damages 
pursuant to Rule 55 (b) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (Arnica, 
page 955). Hatch has the option S> kes, the defaulted party, does not. 
The Arnica case held that the Utah rules, 
grant a trial court the discretion to determine whether a jury 
trial is appropriate in setting damages. Rule 55 (b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure does not specify a right to a jury trial 
as do ihe federal rules but instead, permits a court to conduct 
hearings or order such references as the court deems necessary. 
Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err by allowing 
Arnica to unilaterally withdraw its request for a jury trial. 
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(Arnica Mutual Insurance Company v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 
963. (Utah Court of Appeals-- 1989) 
WAS THE REDUCTION OF DAMAGES JUSTIFIED? 
Howard Hatch agreed with the reopening of the case to release 
Denies Sykes and Patricia Sykes and to hold Dwane Sykes 100% 
responsible for all damages as though he were the only party sued. Dwane 
w a s the culprit, the primary tort-feasor, by his own admission (R. 3310, 
331 \, & 3314). It was mutually agreed that all of the damages assessed 
against Dennis Sykes and Patricia Sykes would be transferred to Dwane 
Sykes (R 2443, pages 7-12). 
The damages would then be subject to review by the court to see 
if there was sufficient evidence to support the amounts found by the jury in 
eacfr of the categories. That review was mutually agreed to by Hatch and 
Sykes in post-trial hearings (R 2443, p. 7-12)-
But Hatch takes strong issue with the reduction of the damage awards 
a s outlined in the trial court's "Order Granting Sy\es" Motion To Alter And 
Amend Judgment And Altered And Amended Judgment'* and the court's 
deleting the award of "reasonable attorney fees after judgment" and the! 
court's refusal to grant costs and attorney fees for the case. (R.2347-2355). 
u 
In the Brief of Appellant submitted to the court on October 30, 1996, 
a return to the total and full damage awards granted by the jury is 
respectfully argued. Certainly the evidence presented to the jury, in their 
judgment, supported the damages awarded by them. And our courts have 
consistently held: 
An appellate court (or a trial court) owes broad 
deference to the finder of fact (the jury) and its power to 
review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of insufficient 
evidence is limited. In reviewing a challenge to a civil jury 
verdict all evidence must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 
817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991); Von Hake v. Thomas, 
705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). 
The reviewing court must assume the jury believed the evidence and 
inferences that support the verdict. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 
P.2d 414, 417 (Utah 1989). Courts should exercise caution and reluctance 
in interfering with jury verdict. Schow v. Guardtone, Inc., 417 P.2d 643, 
18 Utah 2d 135, (Utah 1966). 
WAS HATCH THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST? 
This issue raised in the Sykes' brief is and has been for many years 
res judicata. I latch was always the o\\ ner of the property until it was lost at 
a Sheriffs sale in 1983 brought about by tortuous acts of Dwane Sykes. At 
one time Hatch issued a deed to his 100% owned partnership in lieu of a 
mortgage (you hold this until I pay you back. It was held in trust to assure 
repayment.) Hatch retained ownership and was always the owner. He was 
so recognized when the Sheriffs sale was conducted. The court during the 
15 years of litigation has always acknowledged and recognized Hatch as the 
owner of the property until lost at the Sheriffs sale. Sykes knows this and 
yet he keeps trying to "ride a dead horse." 
REPLY TO SYKES' ANSWERS TO HATCH'S BRIEF 
SIX DAY TRIAL CUT TO THREE DAYS 
Sykes makes an issue of Match's reference to time restraints 
imposed by cutting the time from 6 days to 3 days in which to present 
evidence to support his claims as outlined in his Amended Complaint 
(R 1167-1172). The time limitation did not allow Hatch to put on all of his 
witnesses to support his claims, and to support other claims he never got to, 
including attempted extortion, libel, slander and forgery (R 1169). 
Hatch recognizes such evidence cannot be given in post-trial hearings 
in hopes of getting the court to include such evidence to support findings for 
damages. And yet, that is exactly what Counsel for Sykes is attempting 
to do, to have the court modify the findings of the jury. In post-trial 
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hearings Counsel for Sykes brought in assertions or claims to urge the court 
to reduce or eliminate damages assessed by the jury. Such assertions or 
claims that were not presented during the trial, cannot now be raised in an 
effort to modify the jury's verdict. Sykes had his opportunity during the 
trial to raise any offsets or other evidence that might have caused the jury to 
consider those claims during their deliberations. But it is too late now for 
both parties. As Hatch and the Court both said in post-trial hearings, 
concerning 15 years of litigation, "Enough is enough!" (R 2530 & 2544). 
The court is duty bound to look to evidence presented at trial in its 
weighing the sufficiency of the evidence and not consider assertions made 
after the trial. 
Hatch stands by his claim to full damages assessed by the jury in this 
case, plus interest as calculated by the court. And that is $376,000.00 in 
compensatory and punitive damages as found by the jury, plus $133,942.03 
in interest as determined by the court up to the date of the judgment and the 
Supplemental Findings of Fact on the 5th day of April 1995, for a total of 
$509,942.03 (R 2060-2064). And of course, interest since April 5, 1995 
should be added to the total, according to current interest allowed by law, 
WATER STOCK CONVERSION 
Hatch will stand by his statements in his initial brief (pages 14-16) 
with the following reply to the Sykes' brief on the subject. Hatch 
subpoenaed Melvin J. Ludlow, Secretary of West Smith Ditch Company 
since 1972, to appear in court and testify to the value of the water stock that 
was fraudulently obtained by Sykes (R 1803). Mr. Ludlow had sustained a 
serious injury to his spine and was not able to attend the trial. However, he 
did send an affidavit testifying that each share of water stock was equivalent 
to 24.82 acre feet of water (per year) and that it was his opinion that each 
acre foot of water was worth $ 1,000. That would make .6 of a share worth 
$14,892 (the stock that was fraudulently obtained by Sykes). (Exhibit 80). 
With Ludlow not present to testify about present and past value of the 
water stock, it would appear the jury accepted Hatch's figure of $1,500 as 
the value at the time of conversion and added $4,500 in punitive damages. 
(R3343). 
TRESPASS DAMAGES 
Dwane Sykes in his brief treats his hostile trespass on Hatch's 
property as insignificant or "nebulous" with regard to damages. 
The Court of Appeals of our sister state, New Mexico, held: 
Every unauthorized entry upon land of another is a 
trespass which entitles owner to verdict for some damages. 
15 
North v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico, 608 P.2d 1128 
(1980) 
Our sister state, Oregon has held: 
In action for trespass to land . . . law presumes that 
plaintiff has been damaged, without necessity of proof of 
actual damage. Rhodes v. Harwood, 544 P.2d 147, 273 Or. 
903. (1975) 
Regarding horses trespassing OH the land of another, our own 
erne Court of Utah has held: 
Although evidence of amounts expended for restoration 
or repairs necessitated by damage to plaintiffs premises 
resulting from defendant's horses trespassing would be 
pertinent to show amounts of damage, it was not essential 
that repairs be made and paid for as condition precedent to 
right to recover for damage actually suffered. 
Jury assesses damages and its findings will not be 
disturbed so long as there is reasonable basis in evidence 
to support them. 
Under proper circumstances, punitive damages may 
be allowed in cases of trespass. 
If wrongful act by which one injures another is done 
willfully and maliciously, punitive damages may be imposed 
as punishment to defendant for such conduct and is warning 
to him and others against it. 
Whether defendant's conduct in allowing his horses 
to trespass upon plaintiffs property was willful and 
malicious and whether punitive damages should be assessed 
was jury question. 
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Defendant advances the argument that because plaintiffs 
failed to present evidence of any definite amounts expended 
for restoration or repairs necessitated by the damages to their 
premises, no award of damages could be made. This position 
is not sound. While evidence of amounts so expended would 
be pertinent to show such damage, it is not essential that the 
repairs be made and paid for as a condition precedent to a 
right of recovery for damages actually suffered. . . Defendant's 
attack in that regard is answered by the oft-repeated preposi-
tion that it is the jury's prerogative as the trier of the facts to 
assess the damages; and that because of its advantaged position 
in close proximity to the trial, the parties and the witnesses, 
its findings thereon will not be disturbed so long as there is 
any reasonable basis in the evidence to support them. 
The amount that justly and properly may be awarded 
as punitive damages is obviously difficult to evaluate in 
terms of money. This is also subject to the usual rule: that 
it should be left to the sound judgment of the jury. 
The above quotations all come from the case decided by the Supreme 
Court of Utah in 1963. Powers v. Taylor & Stillnian v. Taylor, 379 P.2d 
380, 381, & 382. (1963) 
All acts of trespass complained of by Hatch took place during the 
time that Hatch owned the land and up to the time it was lost at a Sheriffs 
sale on May 4, 1983 (R 3 & 14, Civil No. 63,695, case that was 
consolidated with present case). The acts of trespass are listed in Hatch's 
Counter Claim filed with the court May 12, 1981. (R 80, 64, 63, 62, 61, 
& 60). Acts of trespass by Dwane Sykes are testified to in testimony given 
17 
at the trial (R 2705-2707, 2918-2925, 2928, 2937-2940, 2968, 3162-3163, 
3334-3335). Hatch lost the property in May 1983 at a Sheriff sale. 
SLANDER OF TITLE 
Sykes in his Brief of Appellee/Cross Appellant is attempting to take 
an offset against the jury award of $105,000, that was awarded for loss of 
the property that resulted from Sykes' fraud and slander of title. But no 
such claims for offsets were made during the trial, when Sykes had every 
opportunity to attempt to mitigate his damages. These claims to an offset 
were brought up in post-trial hearings, not during the trial (R 2567-2569). 
If Hatch cannot bring up evidence to support claims that were not covered 
during the trial, neither can Sykes. The jury took into consideration all 
evidence presented at trial. The jury did not award Hatch damages for libel 
or slander because Hatch never got evidence before the jury to support the 
claims. As the Brief filed by Mr. Sykes would suggest, "what's good for 
the goose is good for the gander." Claims are limited to evidence presented 
at the trial. And that's all the jury had to go by. These same claims hold 
true with Interference with Advantageous Business Relationship. Sykes did 
not attempt to offset this claim in any way. All the jury had to go by was 
what was presented to them. And the jury's verdict should be upheld. 
18 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
On page 23 under Punitive Damages, Sykes Brief states: "Mr. 
Hatch argues that $75,000 in punitive damages is reasonable and supported 
by the evidence." This is not true. Mr. Hatch argues that $225,000 in 
punitive damages is reasonable and supported by the evidence and was 
awarded by the jury, and we ask that it be returned by the Court of Appeals. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
On page 23 of the Sykes Brief on the first line under Attorney's Fees 
and Costs, "the North half should read "the South half." And it was under 
the contract dealing with the south half that was sold to Sykes where the 
water stock was illegally converted by Sykes in violation of the contract. 
Sykes under false pretenses took the water stock belonging to both the 
south half and the north half and registered it in his name when his contract 
called for .6 shares, not 1.2 shares. Hatch claims costs and attorney fees in 
this case as provided for in the contract. 
Hatch also claims costs and attorney fees under Section 78-27-56 (1) 
of the Judicial Code. In this case Sykes prosecuted and defended this case 
without merit and in bad faith as determined by the court and so ruled in 
its ORDER OF DEFAULT (R 2059, 2056 #4) dated 5 April 1995 and made 
19 
of record on 14 April 1995. Hatch also claims and requests costs and 
attorney fees for collections after judgment as provided for by Rule 4-505 
(3) of the Code of Judicial Administration, Utah Code, as requested in the 
initial brief. Costs and attorney fees were awarded by the Court to assist in 
the collection process and were then later deleted without just cause. 
(R 2063-2064 and 2348-2355). 
CONCLUSION 
Hatch requests the Court of Appeals to affirm the trial court's default 
of Sykes and the denial of a new trial. Hatch also requests the court to 
restore the full amount of the jury awards in all categories, restoring the 
original amount of $509,942.03 plus interest on this amount since the 
signing of the Judgment on 5 April 1995. There was no evidence 
introduced at trial that should reduce the jury verdict and award. Hatch 
also requests costs and attorney fees in this case and costs and attorney fees 
in the process of collection all as provided for by law. 
At trial Hatch testified: "While we haven't gone over all the figures, 
we feel we ought to be entitled to $30,000 in attorney fees and we will 
establish that by affidavit and we'll leave that in the hands of the judge to 
decide if they are fair and appropriate if we can justify them. In our costs 
20 
over the 14 year period between 5 and $10,000" (R 3341). 
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of February 1997 
^JA 
Jpencer F. Hatch 
Attorney for Appellant, Howard F. Hatch 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that 2 copies of the foregoing Brief and Addendum 
were mailed this 5th day of February 1997, postage prepaid to: 
Sam Primavera (5413) 
Attorney for Appellee and Cross Appellant, Dwane Sykes 
746 E. 3800 N. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Spencer F. Hatch 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DENNIS L. SYKES, DWANE J. 
SYKES and PATRICIA SYKES, 
Plaintiffs, Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
HOWARD F. HATCH, 
Defendant, Appellant and 
Cross-Appellee. 
APPELLANT'S MOTION 
FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 
TO FILE REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 960561-CA 
-1 
Defendant/Appellant, Howard F. Hatch, moves the Court to grant an 
extension of time of 30 days in which to file Appellant's Reply Brief, 
extending the time to file from January 6, 1997 to February 5, 1997. 
Counsel for Appellant and Appellee are both in agreement in 
requesting that said extension be granted. 
Respectfully submitted this / / day of December 1996 
-I 
Sam Primavera 
Attorney for Dwane Sykes 
&X£ 'AAJ <rT{ 
Spencer F. Hatch 
Attorney for Howard F. Hatch 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Appellant's Motion for 
Extension of Time to File Reply Brief was mailed this / / — day of 
December 1996 postage prepaid and addressed to: 
Sam Primavera (5413) 
Attorney for Dwane Sykes 
746 E. 3800 N. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Spencer F. Hatch 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS SYKES, DWANE J. SYKES, 




HOWARD F. HATCH, ET AL., 
Defendant(s). 
MINUTE ENTRY - DEFAULT 
ENTERED 
CASE NO. 810457127 
DATE: JANUARY 5, 1994 
JUDGE: DAVID L. MOWER 
REPT. BY: VONDA BASSETT 
CLERK: KMJ 
This matter came before the Court for Final Pre-trial Conference. Plaintiffs were 
not present, nor represented by counsel. Defendant Howard Hatch was present with counsel, 
Jeff Hill. Mr. Hill has recently filed his appearance as counsel. Christine Clark, daughter 
of plaintiff Johnny Iverson was present. 
The Court questioned Mrs. Clark. She advised her attending this matter was to 
find out what this matter is all about and whether or not her father needs to be involved. 
The Court and above-named individuals discussed Mr. Hatch's allegations in his 
complaint, how notice has been made, and the desires of Mr. Hatch in proceeding with this 
matter. 
Mr. Hill requested that a default be entered against Dennis Sykes, Dwane Sykes, 
and Patricia Sykes and that judgment enter against the said individuals upon presentation of 
evidence. The Court granted the request and ordered Dennis Sykes, Dwane Sykes, and 
Patricia Sykes defaulted in this matter. The Court to take evidence before judgment is 
ordered. 
The Court ordered the trial date to remain and will await to determine if Mr. 
Iverson has filed documentation regarding, this case. 
Mrs. Clark was advised that should her father desire to file documentation, it is to 
be filed here, in Provo, at this courthouse. Mr. Hill was required by the Court to provide a 
computer 3.5" disc to Judge Mower with his jury instructions. Mr. Hatch is not willing to 
waive a jury. Original jury instructions are to be filed with the Clerk's Office. 
Twenty-five prospective jurors will be called for the selection process. This matter 
will be recorded by audio cassette. The trial in this matter will begin on January 27, 1994 at 
9:30 a.m. 
Mr. Hill is to prepare the appropriate order in this matter. Mr. Johnny Iverson's 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD F. HATCH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENNIS L. SYKES, DWANE J. 
SYKES, PATRICIA SYKES, AND 
JOHNNY IVERSON, 
Defendants 
ORDER ON MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE DEFAULT AND 
RESCHEDULE 
Case No. 810457127 
Judge David L. Mower 
The motion made by Dwane J. Sykes, Patricia Sykes and 
Dennis L. Sykes to set aside their default is granted. The 
motion to reschedule is granted. This matter is referred to the 
Court Clerk in Richfield who will work with the Court Clerk in 
Provo and with counsel to find an agreeable date for trial. 
Signed on February ~X"'\ , 1994. 
\MUu-
David L. Mower, Judge 
9402221.ut 
A O A a 
4T
» Dis'-tfD IH 
uftiOFutfURT 
Dwane J. Sykes, defendant n ^Hff 
Represented by Sam Primavera *"' IJ p 
c/o 2069 Marylhurst Dr. * 26 Pft '$tj 
West Lynn, Oregon 97068 I K } 
phone 503-697-3136 [recon sam] ^ 
IN TFIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD F. HATCH, 
Plaintiff, SYKES' WITNESS LIST 
vs. (PRELIMINARY) 
DWANE J. SYKES, Consolidated Case Nos. 63,695 
^577T27> 
Defendant. " 57,125 
Hon Judge David L. Mower 
Dwane J Sykes lists the following as witnesses which may be called at trial: 
C. D. FOUTIN DEAN ZABRISKIE 
PAT WILLIAMS DWANE J SYKES 
DENNIS L. SYKES PATRICIA SYKES 
MARK SYKES JIM WILBUR 
MARK HALL WAYNE PINDER 
JOHN BECKSTEAD GVVEN EMMETT 
RODNEY DEAN SIDNEY GILBERT 
MARK ROBINSON CHRIS CANNON 
ERMA PACE ARNOl .D BROWN 
HOWARD HATCH MARJOR1E 11ATCII 
LEE "PONY" BROOKS LEON PETER PIEROTTI 
KAREN PIEROTTI RUTI1 RAGOZZINE 
JEAN TANNER WAYNE TANNER 
OREM POLICE RECORD'S OFFICER 
STEWARTS TITLE OFFICER MR CARR, SURVEYOR 
MR. JURASIC (sp?), SURVEYOR 
W. S. GARDINER, SURVEYOR 
OFFICER, UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE. COMMISSION 
OFFICER, UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
CARL LYMAN BILL POPE 
JOESEPH JINKENS , PROVO FORMER TEMPLE PRESIDENT 
RHINWALD LIECHTY 
ALL WITNESS ON MR. HATCH'S WITNESS LIST 
ALL PERSONS ON SYKES' 3-PAGE LIST FILED IN THE 1980's OF HOWARD HATCH'S 
DISSATISFIED BUSINESS ASSOCIATES 
Howard F. Hatch, 
843 South 1150 East 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84602 
Ph: 785-4818 / 785-8000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS L. SYKES, DWANE J. SYKES, ) 
AND PATRICIA SYKES, ) 
Plaintiffs, ] 
v^. 






David L. Mower 
The above entitle matter came before the Court on September 2, 
1994 at 10:00 a.m. for a hearing on motions of the parties and pur-
suant to the Court's Notice of Oral Argument and Scheduling Conference 
mailed August 22, 1994. In attendance were: the Plaintiff (now 
designated the Defendant), Howard F. Hatch, pro se; A. Samuel 
Primavera, who represents the balance of the active parties, Dennis L. 
Sykes, Dwane J. Sykes and Patricia Sykes. As was noted, Johnny Iver-
son has been dismissed as a p^rty pursuant to a stipulation between 
his attorney and the Defendant Hatch. 
A discussion was had on the only outstanding motion not previous-
ly ruled upon, to wit, Plaintiffs' Sykes Motion in Limine. After 
considerable argument on both sides and careful deliberation, the 
Court rendered its decision. The Motion in Limine which requested 
that all evidence in this case be limited to matters occurring prior 
to August 28, 1981, was denied. 
1 
1/1/1/1 
The time needed to conduct a jury trial was discussed and it was 
determined that six (6) days would be allotted, namely February 6, 
through the 10th and the 13th, 1995. Approximately thirty potential 
jurists will be summoned in order to have the necessary eight to 
constitute the jury which will try the matter. 
The discussion of time needed brought up the matter of witnesses 
each of the parties would be planning to call. Approximately 22 
people will be expected to appear as witnesses. Each side will be 
limited to no more than 6 "cliaracter" witnesses, going to the issue of 
credibility. Each side will be allowed approximately 17 hours to 
present his case, including time spent on redirect. According to the 
court clerk, a court stenographer will be used to report the trial. 
Howard Hatch, while technically the Defendant for the purposes of 
titling the consolidated cases, will have the role of Plaintiff at 
trial and it will be his burden to establish his case against the 
opposing parties, who, while denominated the Plaintiffs, will be in 
the role of Defendants at trial. Howard Hatch has been ordered to 
prepare his list of witnesses by October 2nd, 1994. Sam Primavera, 
representing the Sykes, will have until October 9, 1994, to respond 
with his list of witnesses. 
Notice as to any additional discovery required by the parties 
will be given the opposing party no later than October 31, 1994, and 
must be completed no later: than December 31 s t, 1994. Since such 
discovery may lead to the need for additional witnesses, the parties 
shall have until January 9_,__ 1_99J3, to submit to the opposing party its 
2 
1443 
final witness list. A certificate shall be filed with the Court 
noting that such a list has been served on the opposing party. 
Also due by January 9, 1995, is a comprehensive set of exhibits 
expected to be referred to during trial. These are to be submitted to 
the clerk's office by said date for marking. An extra set should be 
retained by the parties with evidence of mailing on or before the due 
date properly identified with a cover page containing the title and 
number of this case. 
BY THE COURT THIS DAY OF S E P T E M B ^ R X 1 9 9 4 . 
' ' • ; • * . ;:ij\\^ W *H»J III**? DAVID L. MOWER 
••• ? r * * * * ' 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed 
Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to attorney for the opposing par-
ties this jy? day of September, 1994, at the address noted below: 
Sam Primavera, Esq. 
3707 N. Canyon Rd. Suite 1A 
Provo, UT 84604 
and that the original and courtesy copy were mailed to Judge Mower in 
Richfield, Utah. 
i -vrr~ Howard FT^'atl 
3 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order 
duly executed by Judge Mower was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
December 
following named parties or their attorney this 7th day of fSjeftypfcflftyifrp, 
1994, at the address noted below: 
A. Samuel Primavera, Esq. 
3707 N. Canyon Rd. Suite 1A 
Provo, UT 84604 
Howard F,.'-liatQh"' 
fr-4 3 S . / l ' l 5 0 / £ a s t 
PI
 v , £ r o v e , / U T 8 4062 
Dwane Sykes, et a l . , 1511 South Ca r te rv i l l e Rd, Orem, UTJfe 
4 1d/M 
ARGUMENT 
Dwane Sykes failed or refused to give the discovery required 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for over a year and a half 
until this court finally ordered them heldf at least those Mr. Sykes 
had with him in the courtroom, so they could be examined. 
It took me, the defendant Howard Hatch, the better part of a year 
in 1983 to get copies of a few originals, see page 6 of Hatch's Reply 
Memorandum of April 18, 1983 attached as Exhibit "A" (only pages 4-7 
are provided since these alone concerned the discovery matter). See 
also Affidavit of Howard Hatch dated November 11, 1982, Exhibit "B". 
We were able to obtain quite a number of copies of copied docu-
ments, all of them clearly discoverable, but only after a terrible 
fight with Mr. Sykes and his attorney, and only after the court speci-
fically intervened and ordered them provided (Minute Entry of October 
25, 1982). See Affidavits of Howard Hatch and Aaron Jepson, attached 
a s
 Exhibits "C S^ D^_ and also found on file in this case. 
Mr. Sykes comes to this court begging for special consideration 
with very "dirty hands". He has done all in his power to subvert the 
judicial process, and now he expects this court to violate its own 
order to accomodate him in his very late and dilatory request. 
It is clear to me that it is a tactic to either put off the trial 
or to cause enough confusion as to make it impossible for me to put in 
the time necessary to properly prepare, i.e. identify documents, 
subpoena witnesses, prepare jury instructions, organize the presenta-
tion, etc. 0£ i_n the alternative to have a basis for arguing on appeal 
o 1 ^7*7 
Dwane J. Sykes, Defendant pro se 
1511 So. Carterville Rd. 
Orem, UT 84058 
ph. 801-225-0686 [witness] 
c< 5 JAri 2 7 PrJ-fci 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD F. HATCH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENNIS SYKES, DWANE J. 
SYKES, and PATRICIA SYKES, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED WITNESS LIST (SYKES) 
(consolidated) CV. 810457127 
CV. 810457125 
CV. 830463695 
Judge David L. Mower 
Dwane 0. Sykes lists the following as witnesses which may be called at trial: 
CLIFFORD D. FOUTIN 
DEAN ZABRISKIE 
PAT WILLIAMS 
DWANE J. SYKES 
















LELAND G. "PONY" BROOKS 




CARR GREER, SURVEYOR 
AUTHUR F. JUESCHKE, SURVEYOR 
W. S. GARDINER, SURVEYOR 
STACEY SMITH 
OREM POLICE RECORD'S OFFICER 
STEWARTS, & ROWLEY LAND TITLE OFFICERS 
OFFICER, UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF REALTORS 
OFFICER, UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
OFFICER, UTAH COUNTY RECORDERS OFFICE 
ALL WITNESS ON HOWARD HATCH'S WITNESS LIST 
REBUTTAL WITNESSES 
V. LEE BUDELL 
4TH HIST. COURT FXIT.U H V L / M O H I N L S R A fOR 
BILL J. POPE 





PRES. HAROLD GLEN CLARK 
THOMAS H. BROWN 
OLIVE HAUETER 
DEWAYME YEARSLEY 
DOUGLAS L. SMOOT 
RONALD MASON 
GRANT A. FARRER 
DR. JOHN M BOWEN 
SID FRANKEL 
BRYCE D. McEUEN 
FLORENCE LEICHTY 
MARJORIE ROSCHER 
JOSEPH A. JENKINS, BROKER 
JOSEPH J. JENKINS, MAYOR 
KARL R. LYMAN 
I. DARRELL BUSHNELL 
THOMAS C. LAMOREAUX 
DON NORTON 
DALE JEFFS 
SHARON P. Y0SH1KAWA 
inARLENE THOMAS 
DARRELL R. STACEY 







ROYAL K. HUNT 
MARK EMMETT 
DAN PRICE 1632 
FILED C'1 [ 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
CARMA B. ^frtfTH, Clerk 
Deputy 
DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
Dwane J. Sykes, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Howard F. Hatch, 
Defendant 
ORDER REGARDING COURT 
AVAILABILITY 
Ciisc No. SI0.157127 
Assigned .finite: David 1.. Mower 
This case has most recently been governed by an order signed on December 2, 1994. 
The order arose out of a hearing held on September 2, 1994, at which Mr. Sykes was not 
present, but at which his then-attorney, Mr Primavera, was present 
At the hearing the parties agreed to be bound by certain limits at the trial so that it 
could be concluded within the time available to the Court. The limits included both time 
limits and limits as to the total number o( witnesses to be called. 
The parties have now filed then witness lists. The number of witnesses m Mr. Hatch's 
list does not exceed the limit. 
Mr. Sykes has filed two witness lists, the first o\\ January 9i 1995 and the second on 
January 27, 1995. The first list contains (') 1 names or titles o\ people. The second contains 73. 
These numbers exceed the limit. In fact, these numbers greatly exceed the limit. 
That excess is the reason for this order. 
The Court is not willing to provide it resources and the community's resources to Mr. 
ORDER REGARDING COURT AVAILABILITY, Case number 810457127, Page -2-
Sykes to aid him in the resolution o( this dispute when he will not comply with the case 
management order. The Court has committed its resources for six days. In addition, the Court 
will use its power to bring 30 citizens of Utah County to the courthouse to be interviewed for 
potential jury service. Eight of those citizens would then remain for the balance of the six 
days. 
It is impossible to complete a trial with upwards o\s 100 witnesses within six days. 
It appears to me that Mr. Sykes is intent upon thwarting the Court in its desire and 
responsibility to resolve disputes. 1 intend to sanction Mr. Sykes lor doing this. 
Several months ago sanctions were imposed on Mr. Sykes. for his failure to follow 
case management orders. The sanction imposed on that occasion was dismissal of his claims 
against Mr. Hatch. 
The only remaining sanction appears to be to enter his default and remove him from 
lhe| balance of this case. 
Consequently, this ORDER IS THE DEFAULT of Mr. Sykes. He will not be allowed 
to appear and defend this action. 
The Clerk is directed NOT TO ('ALL any potential jurors in this case because (I) it 
appears that Mr Hatch is having a problem seeming the attendance of a witness, and (2) 1 
don't believe Mr. Hatch is entitled to present his evidence to a jury when there will be no 
opposing party. 
This Court, sitting with the undersigned, without a jury, will be in session on February 
ORDER REGARDING COURT AVAILABILITY, Case number 810457127, Page -3-
6, 1995, 10:00 am, at the Fourth District Courts building, 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah. 
The Court will be available to receive evidence from Mr Hatch or to react to any other 
j 
requests that he might make. Mr. Hatch will be entitled to such relief as is proved by 
competent, sufficient evidence. 
Dated this / day of February, lc)c)5. 
v— u r * A / W ^ 
David L. Mower /^* .v '^£f*^ 
Judge cU^^o^^^L ^^L £££c-f>-et-<>*i~JL 
1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r h r On February / - , 1995 a copy of the above ORDER REGARDING COURT 
AVAILABILITY was sent to each of the following by the method indicated: 
Addressee MetiuHljM.,.!. „, r,,s„„,t.,x) Addressee Method (KM,.»..pci-«m..F:IX 
Howard F. Hatch \V\ Dwane J. Sykes [F] 
801-785-7534 801-225-0686 
1 7 ^ 
n>,o 'l'-i, rrl \ 
*".)o i f->r-Jt iUW'«- f^' 
Y1 ^ In the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
FOR COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS L. SYKFS, OWANF ,1. 
PATRICIA SYKES, 
versus 
HOWARD F. HATCH 
SYKFS % \ 
Plaintiff. / 
Defendant, ' 
THE STATE OF UTAH SENDS GREETINGS TO: 
SUBPOENA 
Case No. £10457127 
WE COMMAND YOU. That all and singular business and excuses being laid aside, you appear 
and attend before the Fourth District Court of the State of Utah, 125 North 100 West. Provo City. 
at a term of said-Court to be held on the t 2 _ H day of February AD.. 19 25 . 
at / \ 3 0 o'clock £) m., in courtroom #202 , before Judge David Mower . 
You are then and there to testify in the above entitled action now pending in said District Court on 
the part of Howard Hatch and disobedience will be punished as a 
contempt by said Court. 
WITNESS: The Hon _HiivlcL_L^..itoWErL . Judge 
of the fourth Judicial District in and for the State of Utah 
this MJil^^ daY of January A.D.. 1995 
ATTEST, my hand and seal of said Court the day and year 
last above written. 
-/ sn . , 1 •" 
SX v • By 
''y '-'i.: nw 





























IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
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PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT 
Be it remembered that on July 13, 1995 the Partial 
Transcript was electronically recorded before the Honorable 
Judge Mower at the Sanpete District Court House. And was 
transcribed by Richard C. Tatton, a certified shorthand 
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THE COURT: So even if money is paid then I've still 
got to rule on a Judgement NOV and the amount of that 
judgement is open to argument. 
MR. ROMNEY: It can be the same as the amount which 
has already been determined against all three and it can be 
somewhat less. It could be any figure that you would 
determine to be fairly reasonable. 
THE COURT: I think that is what you were saying 
too, isn't it Mr. Nielsen? 
MR. NIELSEN: I don't disagree with that to the 
extent that the court would then make that decision on not 
just the judgment NOV, but the motion from the trial. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. NIELSEN: And those motions would then be 
determined by the court with respect to Mr. Sykes. Mrs. Sykes, 
Dennis Sykes, they're out of the picture. They're gone, no 
other party. Now the court may well determine that based upon 
the evidence that Mr. Sykes is then responsible based upon the 
evidence in the trial Mr. Sykes would be responsible for 100 


























THE COURT: So if the money is paid what you buy 
with the money is the dismissal against Dennis and Patricia? 
MR. NIELSEN: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And you're not buying the resolution of 
anything else. 
MR. NIESLEN: Well, he is buying, if the court 
please, I'm not going to come back and argue that Mr. Sykes 
is only liable for 33 and a third percent under the jury's 
verdict. 
THE COURT: And that's what you were just saying. 
MR. ROMNEY: I would absolutely say that that 
absolutely can't be. You can't use a formula saying that he 
therefore only owes one third. Because under your decision it 
may very well be that it's possible that he is very totally 
liable for the whole amount. The amount may vary. 
THE COURT: So you want to have the possibility that 
if I grant the motion for Judgement Notwithstanding that the 
amount could be equal to the current judgement? 
MR. ROMNEY: Yes, it certainly could be. It could 
be higher. 
MR. NIELSEN: No, I don't think so. 
THE COURT: Well, it has got to be equal to whatever 
the evidence shows. 
MR. ROMNEY: That's right. 
































Well, I would certainly hope so. 
Could be. The court may make that 
THE COURT: If the money is paid and you buy the 
dismissal of Dennis and Patricia then there is only one person 
left to be liable and that is Dwane. 
MR. ROMNEY: So he would be responsible for 100 
percent of whatever you decide. 
THE COURT: Whatever I decided and that is the 
result that you want to reach to. 
MR. ROMNEY: That was my argument. That was my 
argument that I endeavored to make this morning is that under 
the Judgment NOV these two people have to be dismissed because 
they did nothing. Whatever damages there are are his damages. 
They want to try and settle it under, it seems to me Your 
Honor, under the theoretical legal perspective and the legal 
process procedure would be that if you have a jury verdict 
that says 33 and a third, 33 and a third, 33 and a third you 
allow two of those, the remaining person is only liable for 
33 and a third, and 
without any agreement with him, I would be entitled to 
if you let them out I would be entitled to argue the 
jury verdict as 33 and a third and that is all it is. 
Then I would have withdrawn my judgment NOV. I am not 
going to do that and I am not going to withdraw my 
judgment NOV with regard to what the damages show. They 
are entitled to argue here today. I think we should complete 
the argument here today if Mr. Sykes is liable for 100 per 
cent or whatever. I certainly thought that I had made my po 
this morning but as far as we are concerned any damages 
that were assessed and proper and are established by 
the evidence are damages caused by Mr. Sykes, not by the 
others. That is as close, I guess, as to a confession I 
think as one can get. 
MR. ROMNEY: Your Honor, this would be a very 
important intervening factor if these people do pay this 
award or this agreement off this judgment. It is not a 
judgment. It is an agreed amount. If they pay that off, 
I think that would make quite a different problem for 
you because anything left would be a 100 per cent. That 
could be adjusted up or down the total amount. I don't 
think that now is the time and place to argue that until 
we find out if they are going to pay. 
MR. NIELSEN: I think now is the time 



























that TOO per cent is 100 per cent. If these two people are 
out and he is in, my position doesn't change. The evidence 
shows what the evidence shows regardless of who is in or 
out. The evidence shows that whatever damages were suffered 
in this case were suffered as a result of Mr. Sykes. 
THE COURT: If you are going to go through the 
process of changing the jury's verdict, what you do is look 
at the evidence and see what it justifies. 
M R . N I E L S E N : That is correct. 
THE COURT: And if it is different than the 
jury's verdict, if it is different enough, then the court 
has the power to change the jury's verdict. 
MR. NIELSEN: Well, the court is bound by 
restrictions as to just weighing the facts and the court 
isn't going to do that. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. NIELSEN: And I certainly can't argue that to 
the court because that is not proper argument. What I 
can do is argue the evidence only shows one result and that 
is all there is. 
THE COURT: And if I am going to go through the 
process of changing the jury's verdict and the monies 
paid, then there is only one possible person to be liable 
for whatever decision I make. 



























THE COURT: And that is Dwane. 
MR . NIELSEN: That is correct. 
THE COURT: And that is a result that you want 
to have Mr. Romney, because whatever amount is the result 
of that and maybe I wouldn't grant the judgment NOV. If 
I was going to do it, there is only one person would be 
the source of that payment and that is Dwane? 
MR. ROMNEY: That is correct based on that. 
THE COURT: Mow what you are saying you want 
to complete the arguments today? 
MR. NIELSEN: I think if the court please and we 
are here and wo are pre,),) red to -lr'jue. To come back again 
at some later date would serve no purpose. We have spent 
the entire day here. I think in fairness I think ! can 
finish my argument in 10 minutes and I will ask the court 
to give me five minutes at the end, Five to ten minutes to 
respond to Mr. Romney. Then anything that we aren't 
able to and don't argue on the basis of our memoranda. 
MR. ROMNEY: In the event that the payments 
aren't made as scheduled, we might have quite a different 
argument. We might have to argue as to which in the 
past which we would not have to do if they did pay and 
they don't. I think that is the time to do it not now. 
MR. NIELSEN: In that event, then we will come 



























basis, that we were entitled to_.tJie_ri.ght_ to. have ..., 
attorney's fee. 
THE COURT: So right now it is financial for you. 
You can't hire a lawyer because you can't afford one, is 
what's happening to you. 
MR. HATCH: Well, I've been bled white in the 
past, Your Honor, because of the extent of it. Mr. Sykes 
has been allowed to manipulate the Court system for 
fourteen years. The latest was that extension from one 
year to the next. Now he is tryingto. manipulate it 
f ux.th ex .by... s ay.i ng_"Give us a new trial/' I think, .a enouglL-
is enoitghHt_YAur...HQjnLQ3Lx.„a.![Ld.jL.JU^ ink it ought to be denied 
the motion, themotion ought to be totally denied. He has 
had his day in Court, he has had his opportunity for 
fourteen years to fend off, to shuffle around, to try to 
keep us from going to the real issue. We finally got to a 
jury; it didn't/ithem very long to decide what was really 
going on in the case. 
THE COURT: That is your basic argument, isn't 
it? 
MR. HATCH: I would also argue that I don't think 
this Court has the latitude of overriding the jury to that 
extent and I have cited those cases in my memorandum in 
this regard. T|iel..Boren vs.... Moor encase, trial burns 




























for the State of Utah, at least it has been represented to 
me that he is a member of the Utah State Bar. I don't 
know, and I imagine, I am sure it is just conjecture on my 
part. I don't imagine that he is charging him for it 
anymore than I represent to the Court, I am not charging...my..-
client. There is alot to be said for justice and fairnes_s.t_ 
-that goes far beyond the issue of fees and_p_rof.i_t_ and 
economics and so...on... 
I think that the Court can condition the setting aside 
that Mr. Sykes will have an attorney, who will appear and 
who will remain an attorney and can get that commitment 
because you've already got that commitment from Mr. 
Primavera. 
And on the second part of it, I think that the Court 
can adequately manage the case to keep everything in 
balance and which, what would be appropriate. 
THE COURT: I .dqn'.tmean .to indicate by my 
questions about what my intentions on about this motion 
are. 
MR. NIELSON: I understand, Your Honor. 
THE ...COURT:.. Because J keep going hack and forth-
in, .my own mind,, when I.. listen to you Mr. Nielson, I think, 
wjell, maybe I ought to grant it. .Then I listen to Mr-





























the only relationship that was involved here was the 
relationship between Mr. Hatch and this Ms. Carlisle who 
was going to come in ... 
THE COURT: And buy it. 
MR. NIELSON: And put up the $25,000 for it. And 
I will come back to the amount. Mr. Hatch has made a big 
to do in the trial that he ought to recover from Mr. Sykes 
for the damage to the property and that the property is now 
valued at upteen thousands of dollars. I think the Court 
was correct in telling the jury that what .you. ..can only 
award.,!s the value of the property at the time1 of the loss. 
That was according to the real estate appraiser, who was 
not a witness on Mr. Hatch's witness list, the Court 
allowed to testify the value of the property at between 
J>30j.0.00 .and$35,000 an acre for..__thr_e.fi_acxejS-^  So you could 
say well that her value was $90,000 on the low end or 
$105,000 on the upper end. It was not presented to the 
jury in that form but it should have been. gut the jury 
foundthat .....the property was worth $.1 0 5 , .0 QXL--
What the jury failed to take into account and what the 
evidence is clear and undisputed it is that not only was, 
it should have also taken into account and reduced the 
value of the property by what Mr. Hatch's equity was. In 
other words, Mr. Hatch suffered only damages for the amount 




























been valued at $105,000, but he had a $25,000, at least a 
$25,000 mortgage, a trust deed was signed to the bank on 
that property. Now it might have been more than that but 
I'm, again if you look at the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Mr. Hatch, the evidence really only indicates 
that it was $25,000. There is no evidence of a higher 
amount that I am aware of. 
THE COURT: Because that is what Ms. Carlisle was 
going to come in and pay. 
MR. NIELSON: That's right. So whatever Mr. 
Hatch lost, if he lost anything, but it had to be reduced 
by the amount of that obligation that he had to pay, 
$25,000. If he had not lost the property or if the 
property had not been lost then there would have only been 
a value in it, a value of the property less the amount he 
had to pay Zions. But in addition, if you are going say 
that UADA really doesn't have any meaning or whatever, I 
don't how you can avoid UADA, but if you do do that then 
you and I, I mean we have to then look at the trustee on 
that part of the property, too, because the UADA 
partnership had a trustee on the property for $30,000. So 
there is another $30,000 obligation that had to be repaid. 
And so the value of the property based on the undisputed 
evidence would have been reduced by $55,000 or in other 




























would only have been $105,000 less those amounts. So _in 
other words, Mr. Hatch had an equity in the property of 
$50,000. 
THE COURT: Lei me see if I got, if I am with you 
on this now. We had an expert come and say the value of 
this property is at such and such a date was between $30 
and $35,000 dollars. 
MR. NIELSON: That is correct. Market value, 
fair market value. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now I am not sure how we make 
the jump from there to 105. You said it but I... 
MR. NIELSON: Well there are three acres, $35,000 
per acre. 
THE COURT: Per acre. 
MR. NIELSON: I'm sorry. 
, THE COURT: ) Okay, so we multiply, we take 35 and 
multiply it by three therein is 105. Then you take off 25 
for that was obligation to Zions and 30 which was the 
obligation of UADA and that is how you calculate 50. 
MR. NIELSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, I am with you now. 
MR. NIELSON: Those are obligations that are 
undisputed on the record. 
THE COURT: So that's got to be the limit of the 




























MR. NIELSON: No objection to that document to 
being... 
THE COURT: Okay, I will look at copy of number 
85. 
MR. HATCH: Right after, Your Honor, it says 
convey in warrant, in the next line it says "to. be .held in 
tru.st___t_o secure the repayment of $.30^ , 0J30..__ It is clearly a 
deed in lieu of a mortgage. It was never intended., to he..3XL— 
absolute deed. 
THE COURT: So if I go with you on that argument, 
what do I do with Mr. Nielson's argument that I've got to 
reduce the award of slander of title be this $30,000 that's 
referred to? 
MR. HATCH: I'll come to that, Your Honor, in 
just a moment. The point I am trying to make at this time 
is simply that, now this deed was recorded the day before 
the foreclosure sale. 
THE COURT: Signed in '81 but it wasn't recorded 
until '83. 
MR. HATCH: That's right. The Univexs.ity__A.-y 
Development Associates is a limited.partnership hac 
filecL.qn that very day a... petition . to..bankruptcy. It was a 
desparate attempt to try to keep the property from being 




1 HALF OF IT TO MR. SYKES. AND I WASN'T PRESENT, SO I 
2 DON'T KNOW WHAT ALL WAS SAID, BUT I'VE GOT TO BELIEVE 
3 THAT HE MISREPRESENTED HIS RIGHT TO THAT, WHICH PROMPTED 
4 MR. PINDER TO GIVE HIM THAT WATER CERTIFICATE, WHICH HE 
5 TOOK AND PROMPTLY HAD RECORDED IN HIS NAME WITH THE WEST 
6 SMITH DITCH COMPANY, A LOCAL WATER COMPANY THAT'S 
7 INVOLVED. 
8 I PRESSED DWAYNE TO RECTIFY IT. HE CALLED IT 
9 A MISTAKE. HE SAID OH, IT WAS JUST A MISTAKE. I SAID, 
10 "RECTIFY IT." I SAID, "GO INSTRUCT MR. LUDLOW, THE 
11 PRESIDENT OF THE WATER COMPANY, TO GET BACK HALF OF THAT 
12 STOCK IN MY NAME." I WILL BE INTRODUCING AS PART OF THE 
13 EVIDENCE THE DOCUMENTS THAT SHOWED THEY WERE ENTITLED TO 
14 .6, THAT'S 6/10THS OF A SHARE OF WEST SMITH DITCH. 
15 THAT'S QUITE A BIT OF WATER. WITH THE WEST SMITH DITCH 
16 ONE SHARE EQUALS OVER 2 0 ACRE FEET. WATER SHARES VARY 
17 IN THEIR VALUE. SOME ARE TWO ACRE FEET, SOME ONE, FOUR. 
18 THESE ARE VERY HEAVY, THEY'RE VERY CONCENTRATED. ONE 
19 SHARE EQUALS OVER 20 ACRE FEET. HE REFUSED TO DO THAT. 
20 KEPT PUTTING ME OFF FOR QUITE A LONG TIME. THEN HE 
21 BEGAN TO TRESPASS ON THE PROPERTY. HE PUT SOME HORSES 
2 2 ON IT. I LATER FOUND OUT HE EVEN RENTED MY PASTURE OUT 
2 3 TO OTHER PEOPLE AND COLLECTED MONEY FOR THE RENTS. HE SK 
24 I WAS PICKING THE PIE CHERRIES UNTIL I CHALLENGED HIM ON I Q 
25 IT, AND OTHER SUCH ENCROACHMENTS £ 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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1 AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME OR NOT LONG AFTER, HE 
2 STARTED POSTING THE PROPERTY "NO TRESPASSING, D. SYKES." 
3 HE EVEN PUT SOME LARGE PLACARDS OUT, WHICH I'LL SHOW 
4 DURING THE EVIDENCE PHASE, SAYING ANYBODY BUYING THIS 
5 PROPERTY OR TAKING AN INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY WILL BE 
6 BUYING INTO A LAWSUIT, TRYING TO THREATEN POTENTIAL 
7 BUYERS OFF OF THAT PROPERTY. 
8 I LATER FOUND OUT THAT WHAT HE WAS ATTEMPTING 
9 TO DO -- OH, HE EVEN INTERCEPTED OUR TAX NOTICES. BUT I 
10 LATER FOUND OUT WHAT HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO DO IS MAKE A 
11 CLAIM AGAINST THE PROPERTY UNDER THE PRINCIPAL OF 
12 ADVERSE POSSESSION. UNLESS YOU'RE A LAWYER YOU PROBABLY 
13 DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THAT MEANS. 
14 ORIGINALLY IT WAS INTENDED TO PROTECT THE 
15 RIGHTS OF THE INNOCENT, AND GENERALLY DOES. SAY YOU OWN 
16 A PIECE OF PROPERTY, YOU ASSUME ALL OF THIS IS YOURS 
17 THAT'S UNDER FENCE. AND YOU TAKE CARE OF IT, BUILD 
18 STRUCTURES ON IT AND IMPROVE IT AND SO ON. LATER 
19 SOMEONE COMES UP AND SAYS: HEY, MY DEED COVERS PART OF 
20 THAT PROPERTY. IF YOU'VE BEEN THERE MORE THAN SEVEN 
21 YEARS AND PAYING TAXES ON IT, YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO SAY 
2 2 NO, IT'S MY PROPERTY. AND IF IT GOES TO COURT, THE 
2 3 COURT SHOULD RULE THEN IN YOUR FAVOR ON THE BASIS OF 
24 ADVERSE POSSESSION. IF YOU'VE BEEN THERE LONG ENOUGH 
25 I AND TENDED TO IT LONG ENOUGH THAT -- YOU ASSUMED IT WAS 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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YOURS ALL ALONG -- MAYBE IT WAS A DEFECTIVE SURVEY TO 
BEGIN WITH. MAYBE THE ORIGINAL FARMERS BUILT THE FENCE 
3 I TOO FAR, WHATEVER. BUT THAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF IT. 
4 MR. SYKES TRIED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THAT BY 
5 OPENLY TRESPASSING ON THE PROPERTY; PUTTING UP SIGNS, 
6 AND TEARING DOWN -- EVENTUALLY WHEN IT WAS DECIDED MAYBE 
7 WE BETTER SELL THE PROPERTY, BECAUSE I HAD NEED OF SOME 
8 I CASH AT THE TIME -- HE EVEN TOOK OUR FOR SELL SIGNS DOWN 
AND THREATENED THE BROKER THAT WAS HANDLING IT WITH DEEP 
10 I TROUBLE IF HE DIDN'T KEEP THE SIGNS OFF. 
11 THIS IS ALL PART OF WHAT WE WILL CALL 
12 SLANDERING TITLE. 
13 MR. SYKES: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD LIKE TO 
14 OBJECT AS NOT CORRECT. 
15 THE COURT: IT'S ARGUMENT, MR. SYKES. 
16 OVERRULED. GO AHEAD, MR. HATCH. 
17 MR. HATCH: AS I STARTED TO SAY, I HAD 
18 PREVIOUSLY BORROWED SOME MONEY AGAINST THE PROPERTY. 
19 AND I NEEDED TO KEEP THOSE PAYMENTS CURRENT. IT WAS A 
20 STRAIGHT NOTE. AND THE BANKER WILL UNDERSTAND THAT 
21 STRAIGHT NOTES ARE DUE IN A LUMP SUM. YOU DON'T HAVE 
22 FOREVER OR 3 0 YEARS TO PAY THEM OFF. YOU HAVE EACH YEAR 
2 3 THEY NEED TO GET RENEWED OR THEY HAVE TO BE PAID OFF IN 
24 A LUMP SUM. AND THE BANK WAS DEMANDING FULL PAYMENT, SO 
25 I I PUT THE PROPERTY UP FOR SALE. MR. SYKES, OR HIS 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 


























WE'RE ASKING FOR OUR ATTORNEYS' FEES, WHICH 
WE HAVEN'T HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO FULLY COMPILE, BUT WE 
THINK IS GOING TO RUN INTO THE RANGE OF 20 TO $30,000 
FOR COSTS. MAYBE AS MUCH AS $10,000 FOR SUCH OTHER 
DAMAGES AS THE COURT MAY DETERMINE IS JUSTIFIABLE FOR 
WHAT WE CALLED CRIMINAL CHARGES. THEY'RE CIVIL IN THIS 
CONTEXT, BUT THE COURT HAS THE RIGHT, THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
ASSESS DAMAGES FOR THOSE THINGS; THE SLANDER OF MY NAME, 
THE ATTEMPTED EXTORTION, THE FORGERY, FOR THE BAD FAITH, 
FOR THE FRAUD AND SO FORTH. 
I APPRECIATE YOUR PATIENCE IN GIVING ME AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN WHERE I'M TRYING TO GO WITH THIS 
LAWSUIT. AS I SAY, IT'S NOT TO PROVE THE ALLEGATIONS. 
THEY HAVE BEEN DETERMINED PROVED BY THE DEFAULT. IT'S 
TO SHOW THE EXTENT OF OUR DAMAGES. 
THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU, MR. SYKES. DO YOU 
WANT TO MAKE AN OPENING STATEMENT? 
MR. SYKES: J^_DO, YOUR HONOR, 
THE COURT: GO AHEAD. 
MR. SYKES: I APPRECIATE THAT YOU FOLKS ARE 
PROBABLY VERY CONFUSED BY SOME OF THE THINGS THAT HAVE 
GONE ON THIS MORNING, AND THE STATUS OF THIS. WHETHER 
YOU WILL EVENTUALLY BECOME UNCONFUSED OR NOT, I HOPE YOU 
WILL NOT. 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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[ 1] A. 
[ 2 ] Q 
[3 ] A 
Okay. 
Was that executed by you? ] 
Yes, yes. That's my signature. 
[ 4 ] Q. Effective what day? 
[ 5 ] A. November 2nd, 1983. 
[ 6] Q. Could you capsulize, in the interest of time, 
[ 7] what is said in that affidavit? 
[ 8] A. Basically this is a review of the 
[ 9] circumstances that I experienced relative to the 
[10] controversy between you and Mr. Sykes, relative to 
[11] the sale of the property. 
[12] At the time I at least owned equitable realty, the 
[13] real estate company, and later became the broker for it. 
[14] And during this time we had received a listing, valid 
[15] listing on a piece of property that was owned by you, 
[16] and put a sign on the property. We were running ads in 
[17] the newspaper about marketing the property and getting 
[18] it sold. And then during the course of the sale we 
[19] heard some difficulty in that the signs were being 
[20] pushed over on the property. Someone had removed the 
[21] signs and posted warning signs, and basically had made 
[22] it very difficult for us in the marketing of the 
[23] property. And I --
[24] THE COURT: Hang on. Ask another question. 
[25] We're getting into an area we need question and answer. 
2?/? 
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[ 1] MR. HATCH: I thought in the interest of 
[ 2] time — he was reviewing his affidavit and I believe 
[ 3] that was — would you just --
[ 4] THE WITNESS: I was basically reviewing the 
[ 5] affidavit and stating — 
[ 6] MR. HATCH: The items he swore to on an 
[ 7] earlier occasion. 
[ 8 ] THE COURT: Are you offering the affidavit? 
[ 9] MR. HATCH: I am. You bet. 
[10] THE COURT: What about that. Mr. Sykes? 
[11] Number 15. 
[12] MR. SYKES: I would object to this, your 
[13] Honor. It would be more appropriate to have the 
[14] testimony from him. 
[15] THE COURT: I agree. Ask him a question 
[16] about what happened, if you would. 
[17] MR. HATCH: I'm just trying to save the court 
[18] some time, your Honor. 
[19] a (BY MR. HATCH) You've already said that you 
[20] were operating the equitable realty company; is that 
[21] correct? 
[22] A. That's correct. I was operating equitable 
[23] realty. 
[24] Q. And you were contacted by Dwane Sykes, the 
[25] party in this action, and told to cease and desist your 
I 24/<? 
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[ 1] efforts to market the property? 
[ 2 j A. That's correct. I had a letter from him and 
[ 3] I had -- I remember at least one phone call; 
[ 4] probably there were several. 
[ 5 ] THE COURT: This is in 1983 you were 
[ 6] marketing this property? 
[ 7 ] THE WITNESS: Umin -
[ 8] MR. HATCH: 1980 is the date in the 
[ 9] affidavit. 
[10] THE WITNESS: Yeah. I -- the marketing time 
[11] for the property was in February of 1980, that's 
[12] correct 
[13] THE COURT: Why don't you try a proffer, 
[14] Mr. Hatch. You're saying in February -- you think 
[15] mr. thomas would say in February of '80 he was in the 
[16] realty business; he received a listing from you; and he 
[17] went to a piece of property and put signs on it and put 
[18] ads in the paper; is that the proffer? 
[19] MR. HATCH: Yes. 
[20] THE COURT: Mr. Sykes, would you accept that 
[21] proffer? 
[22] MR. SYKES: Yes. 
[23] THE COURT: We've got that. Ask another 
[24] question. 
[25] a (BY MR. HATCH) You said signs were being 
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[ 1] torn down? 
[ 2] A. That's right. We had trouble -- go ahead. 
[ 3] I'm supposed to just answer questions. 
[ 4] Q. Do you have an idea of who tore the signs 
[ 5] down? 
[ 6] A. Well, Mr. Sykes told us he was pulling the 
[ 7] signs down and he made some other comments, too. 
[ 8] In fact, he sent me a letter with quite a few 
[ 9] promises -- or he declared in there he was going --
[10] we were going to get involved in a court case, and 
[11] a bunch of other things, if we didn't take our 
[12] signs down and stop trying to sell the property. 
[13] Q. And let's get to that other matter. I think 
[14] you have that. - I'm just trying to identify it by 
[15] number. It should be right in that same timeframe. 
[16] While she's checking for me, Mr. Thomas. I 
[17] believe you have in your records a copy of the letter, 
[18] demand letter Mr. Sykes sent to you at your office? 
[19] A. Right. I've reviewed that letter, and I do 
[20] recall that letter It's multiple pages. 
[21] Q. Did he say cease and desist your operations? 
[22] A. Yeah He basically said we didn't have a 
[23] right to sell the property I had a listing. I'm 
[24] a real estate broker. It gives me a right to get a 
[25] commission, and I listed the property and went 
MR 
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about trying to sell it. 
Q. Did he say he owned the property? 
A. He said he had some right to own the 
property. And in fact, I recall in the 
conversation saying: "Hey, just show me what 
you've got. I'm not a judge. I'm a real estate 
broker. I market properties on which I have 
listings and we have a plot here. We've got a 
listing and we want to sell it." And I did invite 
him to come and talk, or he in fact wanted to. I 
think, and explain what was going on. But we had 
the listing and we were trying to sell it. 
I have never, by the way, in my history as a real 
estate broker, never had anything like that happen. I 
had seen disputes --
THE COUhT: Ask another question. 
Q. (BY MR. HATCH) By "anything like that," you 
mean like someone challenging the right of a party to 
put the property on the market? 
A. Yeah. I've seen disputes where people 
thought they owned property or they didn't, but 
I've never seen somebody who just came out on 
property and just started taking signs down and 
sending letters. I never received another letter 
like that. And I was actively a broker for nearly 
n (7 n n 
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[ 1] 10 years; involved in real estate for quite awhile. 
[ 2] And you know, I saw -- my judgment was Mr. Sykes 
[ 3 ] was emotionally involved and concerned, but he 
[ 4 ] didn't -- I had a listing and I was trying to 
[ 5] market a property. And if he had action he should 
[ 6] go to the courts and take care of the action. I 
[ 7] was trying to do my job, and I couldn't. 
[ 8] Q. Would you say that that barred you from 
[ 9] selling the property then? 
[10] A. Absolutely. I mean, a sign on a property is 
[11] the number one way People go into an area -- most 
[12] often they get attracted to a particular area. 
[13] They have friends in the area. In this particular 
[14] case it was a unique piece of property, and you go 
[15] by and you want to see a sign up there. That's how 
[16] people buy property. They call in off the signs. 
[17] That's important for us because we get the call, we 
[18] get the prospective buyer, and if we don't sell 
[19] them that property we sell them another property. 
[20] Q I'm going to show you this sign right here 
[21] marked as exhibit number 14, and see if you recognize 
[22] that 
[23] A. I really can't say that I recognize that 
[24] sign. 
[25] Q. But Mr. Sykes did say in his demands on you 
1 7 4?.? 
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[ 1] that he was posting the property? 
[ 2] A. Yeah, he said he was putting up signs and 
[ 3] that he would be taking down my signs if I put them 
[ 4] up. 
[ 5] MR. SYKES: At this time I would be happy to 
[ 6] stipulate that sign was put up at the time. 
[ 7] MR. HATCH: I appreciate that. I was going 
[ 8] to have to ask him as a witness on that, and I 
[ 9] appreciate that 
[10] May I then show it to — 
[11] THE COURT: Can 14 then be received, 
[12] Mr. Sykes? 
[13] MR. SYKES: Yes. 
[14] THE COURT: 14 is received. 
[15] Q. (BY MR. HATCH) So he never did say what the 
. [16] basis of his claimed right was to do that? 
I [17] A. Umm I believe that in the course of the 
[18] conversations he explained to me that he had some 
[19] right on the property; that he had some right to 
[20] the property. My understanding -- he said it was 
I [21] some verbal right And being a real estate broker 
[22] and training agents, no verbal contract is binding 
[23] at all in real estate. And it would have to be in 
[24] writing. And I kept saying: Well, produce a 
[25] written something. I'm not a judge, and I 
Z9LW 
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[ 1] certainly want to support whoever the legal owner 
[ 2] is. But you know, if you have a right to the 
[ 3] property, you have a right to the property. But 
[ 4] verbal agreements aren't binding, and I'm going to 
[ 5] sell the property I have a listing on, and at least 
[ 6] I was attempting to do that. 
[ 7 ] ! Q. So y o u had every reason to bel ieve that the 
[ 8] property d id be long to m e at the t ime? 
[ 9] A. Yeah. 
[10] Q. And you received -- did you receive anything 
[11] from Mr. Sykes to give any indication that he had a 
i [12] valid right to it? 
[13] A. I got a big long letter from him that listed 
[14] a bunch of claims and some lawsuits I was going to 
[15] be involved in if I persisted. But I'm a little 
[16] bit -- you know, I'm a little bit independent. I 
I [17] don't like to back down on things because somebody 
I [18] threatens me with a lawsuit. We made an effort to 
[19] get a letter, but with the signs coming down, it 
I [20] turned out to be so confusing that we took our 
I [21] signs off and stopped trying to market the 
[22] property. 
[23] MR. HATCH: Your Honor, I think I must have 
[24] inadvertently overlooked a letter of Dennis Sykes made 
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A. Yes. It says here: 
"I request again that your equitable realty 
sign come down immediately. Considering the 
problems and liabilities with litigation and 
title pending, I think as an owner you should 
see that your company is not further involved 
and protect you and your company from any 
improper actions of broker." 
The way i would have done this -- and this is what 
I'm sure I said over the telephone, I said, "look, I've 
got a listing. I'm going to get a buyer. When that 
buyer comes in. if you have a claim to title you can 
contest the claim to title. I just want to do my 
listing, make my broker's fee and market the property. 
And this letter is really great. It brings up a lot of 
issues. I mean, there's tons of things going on here, 
but they don't relate to the issue, which is: I had a 
listing on a property and I was trying to sell it. 
THE COURT: You're offering number 49, right, 
Mr. Hatch? 
MR. HATCH: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you made your objections 
before, and you're sticking by your objections? 
MR SYKES: 49 is the February 8 letter? 
THE COURT: I don't know if 1 heard a date. 
2-W 
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[ 1] to. I would like to offer that into stipulation right 
[ 21 now. 
[ 3] THE COURT: What are you offering to 
[ 4] stipulate? 
[ 5] MR. SYKES: I put up all the signs Mr. Hatch 
[ 6] is trying to prove I put up. I refused to let people 
[ 7] come on the property. I did all the things he's 
[ 8] alleging I did to the property. Why I did is in 
[ 9) dispute, but 1 did rt. And there's no reason going over 
[10] all of that, and I tried to stipulate to that before. 
[11] THE COURT: Mr hatch? 
[12] MR. HATCH: That makes me wonder why he's 
[13] asking Mr. Thomas. If he stipulated, let it go. 
[14] Actually, there's no issue because this court has 
[15] defaulted the Sykes. And all of those are established 
[16] by that default, so obviously there's no question. So 
[17] I'm wondering why he's continuing to ask Mr. Thomas 
I [18] questions. 
[19] MR. SYKES: I haven't asked a single 
I [20] question, your Honor. 
[21] THE COURT: Mr. Sykes, there was an exhibit 
J [22] we had that I think was received - I think it was 
I [23] number 14 — and you're saying that's one of the signs 
I [24] you put up? Do you agree or disagree? 
[25] MR. SYKES: Yes. The exhibit he showed is a 
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[ 1] sign I put up. 
[ 2] THE COURT: Is that number 14, 
[ 3] Ms. Williamson? 
[ 4 ] THE CLERK; It is. 
[ 5] THE COURT: You used the word "signs," 
[ 6] plural. Are you offering to stipulate there are other 
[ 7] signs besides exhibit 14? 
[ 8] MR. SYKES: Several others, your Honor. 
[ 9J THE COURT: Are they here with us today, 
[10] those signs? 
[11] MR. SYKES: I think Mr. Hatch has a number of 
I [12] others. 
I [13] THE COURT: Okay. Do they have exhibit 
J [14] numbers attached to them? 
[15] MR. SYKES: I do not t h i nk - -do they, 
[16] Howard? 
I [17] MR. HATCH: I only submitted one of several 
I [18] as an example. I just sent my wife out to the car for a 
I [19] big cardboard one that was on our property we took down. 
I [20] THE COURT: I'm not trying to tell you what 
I [21] to put in, just get a boundary line. 
I [22] MR. HATCH: I only turned in one just as an 
[23] example. 
[24] THE COURT: So Mr. Sykes, you're offering to 
J [25] stipulate exhibit 14 is one of several different signs 
VmmmmmmmwimmmKmm*jmmi^m:^m»ummmmmnmmmmm tmmummmmmmmmmmmmimnmam m« m «w i H I immimmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmtmmmmmmmmmmmm 
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[ 1] that you put up? 
[ 2] MR. SYKES: The point is simply Mr. Hatch is 
[ 3] trying to spend a lot of time proving what I did. I 
[ 4 ] will stipulate as to what I did. There's no contest, 
[ 5 ] and I tried to stipulate before. The contest is why I 
[ 6] did it and why I was reasonable in doing it. I won't 
[ 7] stipulate to his approach as to why, only what I did. 
[ 8] We don't need to spend a lot of time with this court on 
[ 9] trying to establish what I did. because I tried to do 
[10] this before, three weeks ago. 
I [11] MR. HATCH: Lets dismiss the weakest link 
J [12] then, your Honor. 
I [13] THE COURT: Tor sale" signs appear on the 
I [14] property that say "for sale, equitable realty." and you 
I [15] pushed them over and took them out? 
I [16] MR. SYKES: No. no. 
I [17] THE COURT: You're not stipulating to that? 
I [18] MR. SYKES: That's what I'm going to ask him 
I [19] about. 
J [20] THE COURT: But you put some signs up on the 
I [21] property; one of which is exhibit 14? 
[22] MR. SYKES: Yes. 1 understood, your Honor, 
I [23] that I owned the properly and I acted in accordance. 
I [24] THE COURT: I know that's what you believe. 
I [25] But you're saying you put up signs, one of which is 
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[ 1] exhibit 14? 
[ 2] MR. SYKES: That's correct. 
t 3] THE COURT: Do you accept the stipulation. 
[ 4 ] Mr. Hatch? 
[ 5] MR. HATCH: I do. your Honor. 
[ 6] THE COURT: Now. you wanted to ask Mr. Thomas 
[ 7] questions? 
[ 8] MR. SYKES: Yes, I do. 
[ 9 ] 
[10] Cross-examination 
[11] by mr. sykes: 
[12] Q. Mr. Thomas, I believe you said at one point 
[13] you went down -- first off, is it not true your signs 
[14] are a 4 x 4 sign, at least the ones you're using there, 
[15] that you put up on this property was a 4 x 4 sign, when 
[16] it was not in the property, was about this big. 
[17] (indicating), when it sits two or three feet in the 
[18] ground, it was still about this high? 
[19] A. Yes, it was an award winning sign designed to 
[20] gather customers. 
[21] Q. I believe you testified that you thought you 
[22] went out and took the sign down? 
[23] A. I didn't say I took the sign down. What I 
[24] said is you took the signs down. 
[25] Q. Okay. Then I stand corrected, if you didn't 
zip 
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[ 1 ] THE COURT: Now do you want to withdraw the 
[ 2] one that has the sticker covering parts of it. 
[ 3] Q. (BY MR. HATCH) Let me ask it this way, 
[ 4] Mr. McDonald: Does an option give any possessory rights 
[ 5 ] to a piece of property? 
[ 6] A. No 
[ 7 ] Q. If it gives no possessory rights, then a 
[ 8] person would not be within his legal rights to post 
[ 9] signs on a property saying, "this is my property?" 
[10] A. I would agree with that. 
[11] Q. He would have no legal right to trespass on 
[12] the property? 
[13] A. Correct. 
[14] Q. You would have no legal right to challenge 
[15] the title of the title holder as having some rights 
[16] superior to his own, unless the option pre-dated the 
[17] title, the deed and title of the then record owner, 
[18] correct? 
[19] A. Correct. 
[20] Q. So if a person asserted, or did these things, 
[21] would they not represent a slander of title? 
[22] A. They would. 
[23] Q. And the more terrible, that is the more 
[24] flagrant, such as the posting of warning signs, anyone 
[25] buying this property is buying a lawsuit, asserted by 
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1 money that was going to the trust was all being spent } 
2 by Mr. Sykes. It was personal funds in every way, 
3 shape and form. I think Mr. Iverson will testify he 
4 routinely signed a batch of checks in blank and let 
5 Mr. Sykes write them out however he wanted. 
6 MR. SYKES: Objection, your Honor. 
7 MR. HATCH: Let me ask that as a question. 
8 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
9 Q. BY MR. HATCH: Did you ever do that? 
10 A. Yes T did. 
11 • Q. How many at a time? 
12 A. Maybe 20. 40 maximum. 
13 MR. HATCH: That's all I wanted to pursue, 
14 your Honor, in that vein. 
15 Q. Did you ever assert any ownership interest in 
16 the property beyond v/hat shows here marked in black? 
17 A. Are you talking about personally? 
3 8 Q. No, as trustee for the Sykes children's 
19 trust? 
20 A. I don't remember what properties, I don't 
21 think so. 
22 Q. Did you ever inspect the property as such? 
23 A. No, I did not. 
24 Q. ,And you certain] Y_.AS.ser1^ d._no^  
25 . _ in ...the_three plus acres to the back of it? 
3/ti. 
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1 A. Only as trustee as it would have affected the 
2 trust. 
3 Q. Did you put horses on it or use that property 
4 for your own personal --
5 A. There were horses on it. T understandsome 
6 of JDwayne's and some of — T don't know who the others_ 
7 _w_ere • ' 
8 Q. They were not yours? 
9 A.. No, not mine. 
10 Q. So your answer then was you did not use any 
11 of that, even the trust property out front, you didn't 
12 use any of that for your own personal use? 
13 A. Mo. 
14 Q. You said you knew that there was some kind of 
15 dispute going on between Dwayne Sykes and myself; is 
16 that correct? 
17 A. That's correct. 
18 Q. Tell me what you knew about it. Do you know 
19 what the dispute was about? 
20 A. No, not particularly. The only thing that I 
21 know about that dispute was we came over to visit them 
22 one day and there was a big hole cut through the 
23 pyrocantha and I said, "what is going on here?" And 
24 that's a big hedge going across the front of the 


























Tf he has something to mitigate damages or 
would rebut, for example, the appraiser who said 
properties were such and so the property we lost, if 
he has somebody to refute that then T would say that's 
a legitimate witness. 
THE COURT: I have at least got to get the 
witness. What was the name? 
MR. SYKE55: Sid Gilbert. 
THE COURT: Mr. Gilbert. Come up, please. 
SIDNEY GILBERT 
called as a witness, having been first duly sworn, 
was examined and testified as follows: 
DTRECT EXAMINATION 
14/1 BY MR. SYKES 
15 Q. Mr. Gilbert, please state your name and 
occupation. 
A. My name is Sidney S. Gilbert. I am a 
certified public accountant. 
Q. Are you acquainted with Mr. Howard Hatch? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you indicate in what capacity and for 
how long? 
A. I've known Mr. Hatch probably close to 30 
years. 



























MR. HATCH: He used 2 5 minutes of my time 
this morning. 
THE COURT: Mr. Olsen, you wanted to say 
something? 
MR. OLSEN: Yes, I know this witness and his 
name wasn't read prior to the time. 
THE COURT: I appreciate you saying that, 
Mr. Olsen. 
MR. HATCH: I'll waive any objection. I have 
no problem. He's used 25 minutes of my time this 
morning. 
THE COURT: Mr. Sykes, go ahead. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
Q. Would you state your name and your 
profession? 
A. Dale L. Morton, I work for Utah County in the 
recorder's office. 
Q. Would you state what the Utah County 
Recorder's Office is? 
A. They take in documents and record them of 
property owners; real estate in other words, 
Q. And is your role there one of your duties to 





























could possibly happen. 
MR. HATCH: Thank you very much. That's all 
the questions T have. 
MR. SYKES: One final question. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 






Who recorded this document and where was it 
Which exhibit? 
Number 50, the notice of interest document? 
Could I see that again and take a look at it? 
Was that notarized by Mr. Sykes? 
THE COURT: That wasn't your question. 
THE WITNESS: That wasn't the question. You 
want to know who brought it in? 
Q. BY MR. SYKES: Who brought it in and who it 
was returned to? 
A. It was brought in by a Mr. Zabriskie, Madison 
and Zabriskie — 
Q. Are you familiar with that? 
THE COURT: Let him answer the question 
because you asked who it was returned to. 
A. It shows it was returned to an address in 
Orem by saying Mr. Zabriskie was an attorney and had 
















v A / i. 
and he effectively contradicted what Mr. Sykes said, 
had him say in his affidavit. 
I can not spend very much time refuting all 
of the ridiculous statements that Mr. Sykes has made 
with regard either to our case or trying to prove his 
case to you, they are too numerous and I have been cut 
way down on time. 
T need to give you effectively a summation of 
what we have tried to prove and what we feel that we 
have effectively proved to you and this is my facts. 
We have had independent witnesses up here and 
documentation to show that all of these things are 
true, not just my assertions, to prove that they are 
true. 
One, that that water stock was taken. He 
admitted the stock was taken. He admitted he never 
gave it back. That's clear and simple. He had been 
defaulted on that case; that was open and shut. 
That's the reason I took the first item; that was so 
obvious, and he admitted that he took it and refused 
to give it back. 
The trespass. He admitted that, constantly 
going on the property putting up those signs such as 
this one right here. 
This is one of the actual signs that was 
3>^y 
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1 taken down right there. Not just one; he had several 
2 of them. There's one of them that's been submitted 
3 into the record, a warning sign that says essentially 
4 the same thing; a different format. 
5 He admitted he did all of these things. He 
6 admitted he went in there, he admitted he cut down 
7 trees, he admitted he dredged land out of the lake and 
8 strewed it all over the pasture and he rented pasture 
9 to other people. He did a dozen things like that in 
10 an attempt to try to assert a right by adverse 
11 possession. 
12 When he saw that wasn't working — and I have 
13 documentation in my file that — because we did catch 
14 him on that check that he altered. The judge, Judge 
15 Sam allowed us to go beyond the normal limits of 
16 gathering evidence, or in other words, discovery, and 
17 he said because there's a law that says if you — if 
18 there's a prima fascia of fraud, a case for fraud such 
19 as altering a document as that check was altered, you 
20 can go beyond the client privilege. 
21 We were able to discover quite a few 
22 documents in his files where he was telling his 
23 attorney, "We have got to hang in there a few more 






V O L U M E 4 
Complete through the 
1996 SECOND SPECIAL SESSION 
78-27-68. Attorney's fees — Award where action or 
defense in bad faith — Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attor-
neys fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the 
action or defense to the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or.limited 
fees against a party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecunios-
ity in the action before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection (1). 
1988 
Howard F. Hatch, pro se 
843 So. 1150 East 
PI. Grove, UT 84062 
Ph: 785-4818 / 227-6598 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 












OF MELVIN J. LUDLOW 
No. 810457127 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
:ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
Upon being duly sworn, the Affiant says and deposes as follows: 
1. That I am the Secretary of the West Smith Ditch Company 
located in Orem and Provo, Utah. 
2. That I have been in that capacity since 1972. 
3. That I have examined the records and find that on of September 
2, 1975, 1.35909 shares of water stock was transferred from Anthony 
and Ruth Ragozzine to Dwane and Patricia Sykes, as Certificate #303* 
4. That said shares had originated with H. Vern Wentz in two 
separate certificates, one for 1.2 and another for 0.15909 shares. 
5. That each share of West Smith Ditch is equivalent to 24.82 
acre feet (per year) as determined by the State Engineer's office. 
6. That it is my opinion that each acre foot in the West Smith 
Ditch is worth $1,000, that is, I have said that I would not sell my 
own for any less. 
1. The last fully consumated sale was for $600 per acre foot, 
purchased by the CUP? however, in a more recent transaction which went 
to escrow, but never closed, the price was set at $805.00 per acre ft. 
li That i have sustained a serious injury to the spine and am 
therefore physicalU unable to attend court as subpoenaed. 
Further, the Affiant sayeth naught at this time. 
DATED: ^ n s\ 
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED to before me a Notary Public on Er^ 1 \<=V^ 
S /S^^Jfcv NOTARY PI »BUC S3 
DOUGUSLeDOUX ft 
8 7 1 South Orem Blvd. Jj 
Oram, UT 84068 8j 
My Commteaion Expire*: 10-1-97 » 
Slate of Utah W 
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Oct./Nov. , 1980 
Real Estate License Division 
Utah Dept. of Business Regulation 
330 East 4th South 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 841II 
Re; Howard f\ I Id I licensed real estate Broker 
The undersigned persons or their associates feel they have been taken advantage 
of or duped or defrauded by actions of Howard F. Hatch considered to be unethical 
inept or otherwise improper for a licensed fiduciary of the State of Utah. 
Each endorser below has (or knows of) their own particular set of grievances, 
intentionally not detailed here. This form of general, group expression is 
taken to alert the Real Estate Commission to a pattern (often subtle) which may 
reach far beyond the parties listed below (including victims unaware of their 
disadvantaged circumstances) which perhaps is not in the public interest and 
which warrent investigation by proper authorities. 






t i n &rcfjt'. ~\.\..f\L>r~ •\lc.
 :/?S'J; Q&J-'SGfo 01J?M frmbf. 
'// A&Ji^ &+*, *W, ilui pusr^ .
 Ph us*-ot,& 
^ K a r l R I yhm 
J-i&i" /'! '< r y 
± '5 4 X*f'" 
il^ndTG. BtfQOjts 
/ \ h 
y. 
>**-' 
Z$a&ift\/{.XQ n k i n s 
ATE OF CttAM' ) ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Each of the various signatures on these pages were personally subscribed and sworn to by 
the said person, at different dates during late 1980, personally before me, a Utah Notary 
Public. Nearly all signors complained that the wording of this statement was way too mile 
and too weak. They wanted stronger complaint statement against Howard Hatch. But I •' 
stopped obtaining signatures when 1 realized that there were so many victims of Howard 
Hatch who were willing to sign such a statement that I could successfully spend 'ill my 
such si S t J b U l n i n 9 "10re s i 9 n a t u r e s > M seemingly endless victims. So,^ v^ opped'.'.s.efe'k^ g 
Dec. 20, 1980 U)iWM{W^ (continued) / 'li 'ill 
Dwane jTTSykbi', N0~TAKY PUBLIC, ST. OF UTAH ;.. '-^  ' .f? Jl^ '• 
o o 
CO O 
0 ) CO C . 
330 EastP t4th S o u t h " 6 5 5 R e 9 U l * t i o n 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
SuoDlemental page 2 ( o f S | | e s ) 
November
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November , 1980 
Real Estate License Division 
Utah Dept. of Business Regulation 
330* East 4th South 
$<rit Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Howard F. Hatch, licensed real estate Broker 
Tfie undersigned persons or their associates feel they have been taken advantage 
Of'or duped or defrauded by actions of Howard F. Hatch considered to be unethical 
or inept or otherwise improper for a licensed fiduciary of the State of Utah-
Each endorser below has (or knows of) their own particular set of grievances, 
intentionally not detailed here. This form of general, group expression is 
taken to alert the Real Estate Commission to a pattern (often subtle) which may 
reach far beyond the parties listed below (including victums unaware of their 
disadvantaged circumstances) which perhaps is not ia the public interest and 
which warrent investigation by proper authorities. 
Address City Zip Phone Comment 
Frwke l , All Seasons Properties, 412 S 800 W, Orem, Utah 84057 ph.225-7105 
Anthony Ragozzine, 662 W 150 N, Hurricane, Utah 84737 
Ruth VI. Ragozzine, 662 W 150 N, Hurricane, Utah 84737 
Bryce D. McEuen, Orem City Bldg., 56 No. State, Orem, Utah 84057 ph. 224-7800 
florence Liechty, 1465 Apple Ave., Provo, Utah 84601 e h ^ J f i i J 
V
-NV\ ££AjN£H^Jl_> ^ ^ \ ^ T \ VS-loO ^ o o ^ ^ ^^G^{ 
STATE OF UTAH ) ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH j 
Each of the various signatures on these pages were personally subscribed and sworn to by 
the said person, at different dates during late 1980, personally before me, a Utah Notary 
Public. Nearly all signors complained that the wording of this statement was way too mild 
and too weak. They wanted stronger complaint statement against Howard Hatch. But I 
stopped obtaining signatures when I realized that there were so many victims of Howard 
Hatch who were willing to sign such a statement that I could successfully spend all my 
time just obtaining more signatures af^seemingly endless victims. So I stopped seeking 
such signatures. / 1 J //// 
Dec. 20% 1980 
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